The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Virginia after Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville by Marshall, Gary S. & Wicker, Maris M.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 3
1986
The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary S. Marshall & Maris M. Wicker, The Status of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Virginia after Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,
20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 267 (1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss2/3
THE STATUS OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT





The development of the employment-at-will doctrine has
tracked the changing character of the work force from the days of
simple master-servant domestic relations to the commercial reali-
ties of twentieth-century industrial capitalism. The rule grew out
of the humane principle that it would be unjust to employ a la-
borer during the planting and harvesting months, only to discharge
that laborer during the harsh winter. Hence, the realities of the
agrarian economy of the British Isles and the closeness of the
master and domestic servant relationship shaped the yearly hiring
rule. This rule developed into a presumption that a hiring for an
indefinite term was a hiring for a year and extended to all types of
workers.'
Yearly hiring migrated to America, at least insofar as agricul-
tural and domestic servants of colonial times. Gradually, however,
the rule of the yearly hiring lost its purpose as the industrial
revolution began to alter the socioeconomic landscape. No longer
were servants part of the domestic relation; workers became part
of a labor market which generally did not communicate directly
with the master or owner.
The yearly hiring tradition was suddenly replaced by employ-
ment-at-will when, in a late nineteenth century treatise, an Al-
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1. For an excellent discussion of the history of the employment-at-will doctrine, see
Feinman, The Development of the Employment-At-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118
(1976).
2. Id. at 122.
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bany, New York, lawyer named H.G. Wood declared in absolute
terms that "an indefinite hiring . . . is determinable at the will of
either party, and in this respect there is no distinction between
domestic and other servants."' As questionable as were Wood's
motive for stating this rule and his scholarship in arriving at it, the
employment-at-will rule was embraced quickly nationwide."
The employment-at-will rule became firmly embedded in the
American economic structure during the first half of this century,
but has undergone significant reshaping in recent years.5 This doc-
trine has been attacked on two fronts. First, legislatures have stud-
ied the employment relationship and enacted a plethora of statutes
to deal with specific types of unfair treatment of employees." These
include statutes protecting employees from termination due to
their membership in particular protected classes7 and statutes such
as OSHA,' the Clean Air Act,9 and ERISA,10 which prohibit retali-
atory discharge of employees who report employer violations of
these particular laws. In addition, federal labor policy affords job
security to unionized employees through collective bargaining
agreements."
Second, some courts have decided to add to these remedies by
3. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
4. For an early application, see Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E.
416 (1895).
5. See generally Feinman, supra note 1, at 119; Murg & Scharman, Employment At Will:
Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 332-35 (1982).
6. For an excellent discussion of the employee's precarious situation, see Blades, Employ-
ment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404 (1967) (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LA-
3OR 9 (1951)):
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means
of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages.
If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the
various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon
others for all of their income is something new in the world. For our generation, the
substance of life is in another man's hands.
Id. (emphasis in original).
7. Federal statutes protect against discriminatory termination due to: (1) race, sex, color,
religion or national origin (prohibited by Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2a (1982) (Title VII)); (2) age (prohibited by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976)); (3) physical handicap (prohibited by Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)); (4) union activity (prohibited by National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982)).
8. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
9. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1982).
10. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
11. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
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creating exceptions to the at-will rule in both contract and tort.
The contract actions are based on express contracts which may be
derived, for example, from employer representations or company
handbooks,12 or on implied covenants of good faith and fair deal-
ing.13 Tort actions include the public policy exception, which has
the effect of affording a remedy to an employee who has been ter-
minated for taking some action in furtherance of public goodwill.1 4
In Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,1 5 the Supreme Court of
Virginia recognized for the first time a public policy exception to
the at-will rule. This narrow exception was based on Virginia Code
section 13.1-32 which guarantees the right of an employee/share-
holder to "vote freely his or her stock in [a] corporation.""6 This
article will examine the implications of Bowman against the back-
drop of a Virginia tradition of adherence to at-will employment. In
doing so, it will fix Bowman's place on the current continuum of
public policy exceptions and will discuss its precedential prospects.
It is suggested that Bowman's message is not one of departure
from the Virginia at-will tradition, but rather another instance
where the Virginia Supreme Court properly deferred to a legisla-
tive scheme rather than engaging in judicial legislation. In essence,
Bowman represents the enforcement of Virginia Code section 13.1-
32, rather than any startling new policy announcement by the
court.
12. See, e.g., Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (just cause ter-
mination provision based on employer handbook), aff'd without opinion, 624 F.2d 1092 (3d
Cir. 1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, -, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884
(1980) (The court found employer had contractually bound itself not to discharge the plain-
tiff except for just cause because employer had told plaintiff when it hired him that he
would be with the company "as long as [he] did [his] job.").
13. See, e.g., Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (female plain-
tiff in early fifties stated cause of action for employer violation of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing where termination allegedly due to plaintiff's age and sex); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (implying
a "covenant of good faith and fair dealing ... in all contracts, including employment con-
tracts"); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (cove-
nant implied where employer acted in bad faith by discharging employee to avoid paying
commission due for large sale); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487, 491
(Mont. 1984) (finding that covenant arises out of the employment relationship and exists
"apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties" and applies to proba-
tionary as well as regular employees); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, _, 316
A.2d 549, 551 (1974) ("termination ... motivated by bad faith or malice ... constitutes a
breach of the employment contract").
14. See infra notes 17-68 and accompanying text.
15. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
16. Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32 (Repl. Vol. 1985) (re-
pealed 1986)).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTIONS
A. Standards for Defining Public Policy Exceptions
The public policy exception to the at-will rule provides employer
accountability for the discharge of an employee when the reason
for and effect of the discharge conflict with an established public
policy. 17 The spectrum of public policy exceptions forms a contin-
uum, ranging from narrow exceptions founded on clearly defined
rights and prohibitions to broad exceptions based on employee ac-
tion taken in furtherance of a vague moral or social obligation.
Generally, a discharge in contravention of public policy creates a
cause of action in tort, thereby allowing potentially expansive dam-
ages.18 Some courts recognize only a contract action, however,
thereby effectively limiting the employee's remedies to backpay
and reinstatement.'9
An employee alleging wrongful discharge in contravention of
public policy has the burden of showing causation between the rea-
son for termination and some established public policy. 20 The exis-
tence of causation is an issue of fact, while the determination of
whether a "public policy" is a phenomenon worthy of rebutting the
at-will presumption is generally one of law.2
Courts confronted with this public policy determination have
been troubled by the vagueness inherent in the term.
The question, what is public policy in a given case, is as broad as the
question of what is fraud .... Public policy is a vague expression,
and few cases can arise in which its application may not be dis-
puted. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts. . ., says: "It has never
been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of defini-
17. See generally Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employ-
ees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 449 (1985); Murg & Scharman, supra note 5, at 343-55; Note,
Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (plaintiff allegedly wrongfully discharged for refusal to participate in illegal
retail gasoline price-fixing scheme allowed to go forward with tort action).
19. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employer
breached employment contract by terminating employee for her refusal to date supervisor).
20. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, -, 417 A.2d 505, 512
(1980).
21. See Pierce, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505. But see Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
121 N.H. 915, -, 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (1981) (existence of public policy sufficient to give
rise to wrongful discharge action is properly left to jury).
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tion in the same manner as fraud." By "public policy" is intended
that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against
the public good .... 22
Some courts have found the determination of public policy so
problematic that they refrain entirely from acknowledging any
public policy exceptions, deferring instead to state legislative ac-
tion.23 For example, in Murphy v. American Home Products
Corp.,24 the plaintiff had been fired for revealing to defendant cor-
porate directors illegal manipulation of pension funds. The New
York court refused to recognize a wrongful discharge action, stat-
ing that "[i]f the rule of nonliability for termination of at-wil em-
ployment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished through a
principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public
ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial resolution of the
partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants. '25
The general standard applied by those courts which do recognize
public policy exceptions involves two criteria: (1) identification of
public interests that are sufficiently important to override the em-
ployers' interests in freely conducting business; and (2) sufficient
consistency in their administration to provide predictable results.2
The difficulty with this standard is that the criteria are at odds
with one another. Because courts must weigh public versus em-
ployer interests on a case-by-case basis where there has been no
22. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, _ 344 P.2d 25,
27 (1959) (emphasis in original).
23. See, e.g., Reich v. Holiday Inn, 454 So. 2d 982 (Ala. 1984) (no cause of action for
plaintiff who was fired after she refused to pay certain invoices submitted to her employer,
where she believed that payment would have been a criminal act); Bender Ship Repair, Inc.
v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1980) (even though jury duty constitutes public policy
exception in other jurisdictions, Alabama refused to recognize); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire
Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977) (where plaintiff had been fired after refusing to
falsify certain medical records, court found public policy exception "too nebulous a standard
to justify its adoption"); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, -, 251 S.E.2d
51, 52 (1978) (where plaintiff allegedly terminated because he was about to report illegal
employer activities, court stated that "[t]here is no room for this exception in Georgia");
Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 876-77 (Miss. 1981) (Where the plaintiff
was allegedly discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim, the court stated: "[tihis
public policy decision is not only a proper, but an exclusive, subject for the legislature to
consider.").
24. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
25. Id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
26. This standard is suggested in Mallor, supra note 17, at 461.
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direct legislative pronouncement, 27 employers are left to speculate
in advance as to whether a specific discharge will be wrongful. Fur-
thermore, the case-by-case determination may foster litigation of
frivolous claims, causing an economic burden on employers and a
case-load burden on the courts-consequences in themselves con-
trary to the public interest.
B. The Continuum of Public Policy Exceptions
1. Employee Refusal to Commit Unlawful Act or Employee Exer-
cise of a Statutory Right-The Narrowest Exceptions
The narrowest exceptions are those arising from termination due
either to employee refusal to commit a specific unlawful action or
to employee exercise of a statutory right. This type of exception is
the most widely accepted, probably because the particular statu-
tory scheme involved supplies an indicator of both the significance
of the public interest and the predictive value to employers.
In the seminal public policy case of Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,28 the Supreme Court of California had
no difficulty in identifying the public policy advanced by the plain-
tiff because it was articulated in a state statute making the com-
mission of perjury a crime. There, the plaintiff, who had been em-
ployed as a business agent by the defendant union, alleged that he
had been dismissed for refusing to testify falsely under oath to a
legislative committee. The court found that
in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against
perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally un-
limited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an
unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the em-
ployee's refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be
without reason and contrary to the spirit of the law.29
Over twenty years later, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 0
the California court reaffirmed the principle of Petermann that "a
duty [is] imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement
the fundamental public policies embodied in the state's penal stat-
27. Id.
28. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
29. Id. at -, 344 P.2d at 27.
30. 27 Cal. 3d 170, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
272 [Vol. 20:267
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utes."31 The facts of Tameny were similar to those of Petermann
in that the defendants had pressured the plaintiff to violate federal
and state antitrust laws by fixing retail gasoline prices. While the
court spoke expansively of "[tihis development at common law
[that] shows that the employer is not so absolute a sovereign of the
job that there are not limits to his prerogative," 32 it was careful to
limit the exception to employer insistence on statutorily prohib-
ited conduct.
North Carolina and Texas, states generally more conservative
than California, have recently recognized the narrow Petermann-
type exception to at-will employment. In Sides v. Duke Hospital,"
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a tort
claim brought for wrongful discharge allegedly due to the plain-
tiff's testimony in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff had
been advised by attorneys for the defendant, Duke Hospital, that
her job would be in jeopardy if she were to testify truthfully
against the defendant. The court held that "no employer in this
State, notwithstanding that employment is at will, has the right to
discharge an employee and deprive him of his livelihood without
civil liability because he refuses to testify untruthfully or incom-
pletely in a court case."3
4
In Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,"5 the Supreme Court of
Texas reversed summary judgment for the defendant employer
where the plaintiff was allegedly discharged for refusing to pump
,the bilge of a boat on which he worked into water, where such
pumping was prohibited by federal law. The court carefully limited
its decision, holding that
public policy, as expressed in the laws of this state and the United
States which carry criminal penalties, requires a very narrow excep-
tion to the employment-at-will doctrine .... That narrow excep-
tion covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason
that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.36
In each of these cases, two factors were present. First, the public
31. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
32. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
33. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985).
34. Id. at -, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
35. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). For a comprehensive discussion of this case at the court
of appeals level, see Note, Master and Servant, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 457 (1985).
36. Sabine, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
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policy was enunciated clearly by a written state or federal law. Sec-
ond, the discharge presented a threat of frustrating that policy.
These factors are also characteristic of cases where employees
were terminated for the exercise of a statutory right. For example,
in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,"7 an employee was termi-
nated for filing a workers' compensation claim. Although the work-
ers' compensation act did not provide a remedy for retaliatory dis-
charge, the court held that "in order for the goals of the Act to be
realized and for public policy to be effectuated, the employee must
be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without being
subject to reprisal."38 Accordingly, while reaffirming the termina-
ble-at-will rule, the Indiana court created a narrow public policy
exception. Had it not done so, employees with valid workers' com-
pensation claims would likely be forced to choose between filing
their claims or losing their jobs. Many state legislatures, including
Virginia's, have responded to this judicially created exception by
statutorily prohibiting the discharge of an employee for participat-
ing in workers' compensation. 9
Several courts have recognized a public policy exception where
employees were discharged for refusing to take a polygraph exami-
nation. In Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.40 and Cordle v.
General Hugh Mercer Corp.,41 the courts considered statutes
which limit the use of polygraph tests by employers as indicative of
state recognition of an individual's right to privacy.42 To give effect
to this recognition, these courts deemed it necessary to afford a
wrongful discharge remedy to an employee who had exercised that
right.
Another line of cases recognizes wrongful discharge claims where
at-will employees have been terminated due to performance of a
legal duty, such as jury service. In Nees v. Hocks,43 the Supreme
37. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
38. Id. at -, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
39. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
40. 611 F.2d 1363, 1364 (3d Cir. 1979).
41. 325 S.E.2d 111 (W.Va. 1984).
42. In Cordle, the court stated;
It is contrary to the public policy of West Virginia for an employer to require or
request that an employee submit to a polygraph test or similar test as a condition of
employment and . . . the public policy against such testing is grounded upon the
recognition in this state of an individual's interest in privacy.
Id. at 117.
43. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); see also Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
274 [Vol. 20:267
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Court of Oregon based its recognition of the public policy excep-
tion on the Oregon Constitution,44 which provides that jury trials
shall be preserved in civil cases, and on the Oregon statute45 which
provides a penalty for failure of a juror to report for duty. The
court stated, "If an employer were permitted with impunity to dis-
charge an employee for fulfilling her obligation of jury duty, the
jury system would be adversely affected... [and] [t]he will of the
community would be thwarted. '46
In summary, all of these cases represent the narrowest type of
public policy exception. They share the common denominator of a
clear, legislatively expressed public policy which would be effec-
tively thwarted without a judicially created remedy.
2. Employee "Whistle-Blowing"-The Midpoint
The midpoint on the public policy continuum consists of what
are commonly called "whistle-blower" cases. These cases involve
employees who have been terminated for allegedly upholding some
important public obligation. Exceptions advanced in this area are
broader in that they are not always grounded in a statutory right
or policy. As the public policies move farther from articulated leg-
islative policy, courts are less willing to permit any disturbance of
the at-will relationship. Courts have been willing, however, to ac-
cept public policy exceptions where an employee has been termi-
nated for reporting a violation of some specified law, particularly
when the implementation of that law allegedly affects the public at
large.4'7
Harless v. First National Bank48 is an excellent example of a
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
44. OIL CONST. art. I, § 17.
45. OR. REV. STAT. § 10.990 (1983).
46. Nees, 272 Or. at -, 536 P.2d at 516.
47. See, e.g., Cooke v. Alexander & Alexander, 40 Conn. Supp. 246, 488 A.2d 1295 (1985)
(employee stated wrongful discharge cause of action when fired so that employer could
avoid payment of bonuses and vesting of thrift plan benefits; public policy based on state
statute requiring payment of compensation). For somewhat unusual case authorizing a cause
of action based on the exercise of constitutional rights, see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (public policy exception based on federal and state constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech, where employee had been discharged for refusing to par-
ticipate in employer's lobbying effort and had privately stated opposition to company's po-
litical stand); cf. Ring v. River Walk Manor, 596 F. Supp. 393 (D. Md. 1984) (remanded to
state court to determine whether first amendment constitutes Maryland public policy on
which wrongful discharge claim can be based).
48. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
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"whistle-blower" case. In Harless, a loan, officer was fired after re-
porting to the appropriate authorities that the bank was
overcharging customers on the prepayment of their installment
loans. In recognizing a wrongful discharge action, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia based the public policy excep-
tion on the legislative pronouncement of the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act49 which was designed to protect a
large segment of the population.5
In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,51 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut embraced a similar public policy exception. The
plaintiff, who was employed as a quality control director for a fro-
zen food producer, reported to his superiors production deviations
from the standards required for packaging frozen foods. These de-
viations resulted in misleading labels which were in violation of a
Connecticut statute. The court based a public policy exception on
the plaintiff's corporate responsibility to "exercise independent,
expert judgment in matters of product safety"52 and on the neces-
sity of upholding the packaging laws.
Most courts have shied away, however, from creating public pol-
icy exceptions encompassing the performance of a non-statutory
public obligation. 3 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowl-
edged that a discharge might give rise to a tort cause of action
where a recognized, but non-statutory, public policy is threatened,
but declined to do so in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.54 In
this case, the plaintiff Geary asserted that "he was acting in the
best interests of the general public as well as of his employer in
opposing the marketing of a product which he believed to be defec-
49. W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-101 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
50. Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275-76.
51. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
52. Id. at -, 427 A.2d at 388.
53. See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513
(1978) (no cause of action where nurse who was fired after refusing to reduce the amount of
hours worked by nurses based public policy argument on broad policy statement giving
State Board of Nursing regulatory authority); Warthen v. Toms River Community Memo-
rial Hosp., 119 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (1985) (no cause of action for nurse fired after
refusing to dialyze a patient because of her moral and philosophical objections to the proce-
dure); Maus v. National Living Centers Inc., 633 S.W.2d. 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (no cause
of action where nurse fired after complaining about poor patient care, even though required
to do so by Texas statute; court left recognition of cause of action to legislature).
54. 426 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1983) (court found cognizable expression of public policy from U.S. CONST.
amend. I and PA. CONST. art. I, § 7, which provides that "[e]very citizen may freely speak,
write and print on any subject").
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tive. ' 55 In failing to recognize Geary's wrongful discharge claim,
the court was influenced by the facts that Geary's duties did not
include making judgments in matters of product safety and that
Geary failed to allege any employer violation of a statute or clearly
established public policy.56
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.57 shares a similar percep-
tion of the public policy exception. The plaintiff in Pierce urged
the Supreme Court of New Jersey to create an exception based on
a professional code of ethics, specifically the Hippocratic Oath.
The plaintiff was fired after refusing to continue research on the
development of a drug containing saccharin because she believed
the drug might produce harmful effects when tested on children or
elderly persons. Like the Geary court, the Pierce court acknowl-
edged the validity of a public policy exception when a discharge
has been contrary to a clear expression of public policy. It even
conceded that a professional code of ethics could, under appropri-
ate facts, represent such an expression. 8 However, because the
plaintiff had alleged only that saccharin was controversial, but not
conclusively dangerous, the court found "no public policy against
conducting research on drugs that may be controversial, but poten-
tially beneficial to mankind, particularly where continuation of the
research is subject to approval by the FDA."5 9
The minority approach within this area of public policy excep-
tions is to shelter acts which an employee had no legal or statutory
duty to perform or which effectuate no specific public policy. This
radical approach is exemplified by Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co.60 There, the Supreme Court of Illinois found a pub-
lic policy favoring citizen crime-fighters that was strong enough to
rebut the at-will presumption. Palmateer had been discharged in
retaliation for reporting to the authorities that a co-employee was
possibly engaging in criminal activities and agreeing to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of the crime.6 The court's lan-
guage indicates the extreme to which the public policy exception
can be taken:
55. Geary, 426 Pa. at , 319 A.2d at 178 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at -, 319 A.2d at 178-79.
57. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
58. Id. at -, 417 A.2d at 512.
59. Id. at -, 417 A.2d at 514.
60. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
61. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
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No specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to
take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but
public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters. . . . Public
policy favors Palmateer's conduct in volunteering information to the
law-enforcement agency. Once the possibility of crime was reported,
Palmateer was under a statutory duty to further assist officials
when requested to do so.2
It is significant that the court found a statutory basis for the ex-
ception in Palmateer's duty to assist officials after the possible
crime was reported. This strained rationale raises the possibility
that all vigilante-type employees will find themselves within the
"safe harbor" of clear legislative policy simply by making reports
of "possible" criminal activity.
Indeed, one of the dissenting justices, who had supported a pub-
lic policy exception in a previous case, feared that the Palmateer
court was venturing into dangerous territory by embracing a public
policy exception not founded on legislative policy. He warned that:
[t]he new tort for retaliatory discharge is in its infancy. In nurturing
and shaping this remedy, courts must balance the interests of em-
ployee and employer with the hope of fashioning a remedy that will
accommodate the legitimate expectations of both. In the process of
emerging from the harshness of the former rule, we must guard
against swinging the pendulum to the opposite extreme.63
In summary, the middle range of public policy exceptions will
disturb the at-will relation to protect employees who have reported
specific illegal employer activity. A small minority of courts have
gone so far as to recognize the exception for an employee who re-
ported possible illegal activities of co-employees. It is the very un-
predictability inherent in this latter approach that has prompted
some states to enact "whistle-blower" statutes. These laws gener-
ally protect employees from being discharged for reporting viola-
tions or suspected violations of state or federal law or regulation,
or municipal ordinance or regulation. 4 They represent a studied
approach to this issue and embody specific prohibitions and spe-
cific remedies.
62. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 884.
64. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West Supp. 1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 15.362 (West 1981).
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3. Employee Complaints Over Matters of Public Well-Be-
ing-The Outer Limit
The outer limit of the public policy continuum is the area in
which judicial intervention is the least likely because the facts in-
volve private matters with minimal impact on public well-being.6 5
Most courts clearly refrain from creating a new cause of action
when faced with such circumstances. For example, the plaintiff in
Rossi v. Pennsylvania State University66 urged the court to recog-
nize substantial public policy based on an employee's well-founded
complaint about the waste of tax dollars and ineffective manage-
ment practices of his state employer. Consistent with Pennsylvania
wrongful discharge case law, the court refused to do so. "An excep-
tion has been introduced to [the at-will] . . . rule under the public
policy limitations, but there must be a clear mandate of public
policy that has been violated, in order to trigger the exception. '67
While it is arguable that management of tax dollars indirectly af-
fects a large segment of the population, the court focused only on
whether a clear, presumably legislatively mandated policy had
been violated. Finding only broad generalizations rather than alle-
gations of specific misconduct, the court rejected the employee's
good intentions as grounds for the exception. 8
III. THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN VIRGINIA
Virginia consistently has embraced the at-will doctrine through-
out this century. In general, its courts have adhered to the rule
"that where no specific time is fixed determining the duration of
the employment, it is presumed to be an employment at-will, ter-
minable at any time by either party, and this is so even when the
consideration is to be paid at specific intervals
65. See Mallor, supra note 17, at 466.
66. 340 Pa. Super. 39, 489 A.2d 828 (1985).
67. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
68. Id. For cases where employee's good intentions or personal grievances have not consti-
tuted public policy, see Boresen v. Robhn & Haas, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(employee terminated for complaining about internal mismanagement), afl'd without opin-
ion, 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977) (employee terminated for announcing intention to attend night school); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (employee terminated after re-
porting numerous inadequacies and potential illegalities in management); Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (employee terminated for smok-
ing marijuana in presence of other employees and for having an affair with secretary).
69. Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932); see also
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A. Virginia Supreme Court Decisions
The foundation for Virginia's at-will employment tradition was
laid in Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road,70 which stands for the proposition that where there is an
agreement to render services, either party may terminate the
agreement at any time unless the agreement expressly provides for
a definite completion date. In Stonega, Virginia Coal & Iron Co.,
Stonega's assignor, agreed to build a railroad line from its mines
and plants to the railroad yard in return for free railroad service.
Several years later, however, the railroad notified the coal company
that it would no longer adhere to the agreement. The railroad's
demurrer to the coal company's complaint was sustained, and the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. 71 The controlling question was
whether defendants had the right to terminate the contract.
The contract sued on was one for the rendition of services on the
part of the railroad company. There is nothing said in the agree-
ment as to the time during which it should continue .... [W]hen a
contract calls for the rendition of services, if it is so far incomplete
as that the period of its intended duration cannot be determined by
a fair inference from its provisions, either party is ordinarily at lib-
erty to terminate it at-will .... 72
This contract principle was applied in the employment context
in two 1932 cases. In Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 7 3 the
plaintiff asserted that he had a contract of employment for a one-
year term based on the statement of his pay as twenty-four hun-
dred dollars annually. His former employer contended that plain-
tiff's contract was of an indefinite duration or, at most, for a
month's duration. Thus, the critical issue for the court was
whether there had been a hiring for a definite period or merely a
general hire of indefinite duration. The Virginia Supreme Court re-
affirmed "the settled doctrine . ..that where no specific time is
fixed determining the duration of the employment, it is presumed
Boyette, Terminating Employees in Virginia: A Roadmap for the Employer, the Employee,
and Their Counsel, 17 U. RICH. L. RE v. 747 (1983) (general discussion of employment-at-will
in Virginia).
70. 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906).
71. Id. at 226-30, 55 S.E. at 552-54.
72. Id. at 226, 55 S.E. at 552 (emphasis added).
73. 158 Va. 586, 164 S.E. 397 (1932).
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to be an employment at will."'74
On the same day it decided Hoffman, the court issued a similar
opinion in Title Insurance Co. v. Howell. 5 Again the court stated
that a contract of employment for an indefinite term may be ter-
minated at the will of either party. Finding that the plaintiff was
never promised employment for a definite period, but had "merely
a general contract of hiring," 76 the court found the plaintiff's em-
ployment terminable at will.
Almost twenty years later the court was asked to reexamine the
Stonega doctrine in Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Co.77 In
this case, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Black Dia-
mond whereby they were appointed "exclusive railway sales
agents" entitled to a two percent commission on all sales. Approxi-
mately two years later Black Diamond informed the plaintiffs that,
because it was going "in-house," their services were no longer
needed. The plaintiffs then instituted a contract action to which
Black Diamond demurred. The trial court sustained Black Dia-
mond's demurrer, and the plaintiffs appealed. 78
Because the plaintiffs admitted that their agreement "did not
provide a specific time for its duration," Black Diamond argued
that Stonega controlled .7 Noting that it had been over fifty years
since Stonega was decided, the plaintiffs asked the court to adopt
a different rule. In declining this invitation, the court wrote:
Manifestly the agreement of September, 1960 between the parties
... was terminable at will by either party. For us to hold otherwise
would necessitate our making a contract for the Plaskitts and Black
Diamond which they did not make for themselves. We would have
to insert an essential element that is omitted-a date for its
termination."
Stonega and its progeny were reaffirmed two years later in
Wards Co. v. Lewis & Dobrow, Inc.81 In Wards Co., the parties
74. Id. at 594, 164 S.E. at 399 (emphasis added).
75. 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387 (1932).
76. Id. at 717-18, 164 S.E. at 389.
77. 209 Va. 460, 164 S.E.2d 645 (1968).
78. Id. at 460-61, 164 S.E.2d at 646.
79. Id. at 462, 164 S.E.2d at 647.
80. Id. at 465, 164 S.E.2d at 649 (emphasis added).
81. 210 Va. 751, 173 S.E.2d 861 (1970).
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entered into an agreement whereby Lewis & Dobrow was hired to
provide Wards with advertising services. Wards canceled the ar-
rangement shortly thereafter. Lewis & Dobrow sued, claiming
breach of a one-year agency contract. Wards asserted, and the su-
preme court agreed, that the contract was for an indefinite period
and thereby terminable at-will.8 2 Citing Stonega, Title Insurance
and Plaskitt as authority, the court stated: "We have long held
that a contract to furnish services or a contract of employment for
an indefinite period is, upon reasonable notice, terminable at will
by either party."3
While Virginia courts traditionally have defined "definite time"
to be a period certain in either years, months or days, the Virginia
Supreme Court has on one occasion departed from this definition.
In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Harris,4 the court stated that
to rebut the at-will presumption one must show that a specific
time was fixed for the duration of the employment.8 5 However, the
court went on to hold that a contractual right to continued em-
ployment until the employer has "just cause to end it" also consti-
tutes a "definite time."88
Norfolk Southern involved a unique factual situation. The case
arose in the Virginia courts after a decision by the United States
Supreme Court that state courts had concurrent jurisdiction with
the Railway Adjustment Board to resolve discharge grievances
under the Railway Labor Act.' 7 Thus, although Norfolk Southern
was brought in state court, it involved a collective bargaining
agreement required under the Railway Labor Act. As such, it was a
federal contract and therefore governed and enforceable by federal
law.88 The plaintiff was a railroad engineer who brought suit in
state court to contest his discharge under the collective bargaining
agreement that governed his employment. Like other railroads in
the 1940's, Norfolk Southern had an agreement with the union
which specifically limited the railroad's right to discipline or dis-
miss engineers during the agreement's term:
(a) Engineers will not be disciplined or dismissed from the service
82. Id. at 756, 173 S.E.2d at 865.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d 110 (1950).
85. Id. at 976, 59 S.E.2d at 114.
86. Id.
87. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982).
88. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d 110.
282 [Vol. 20:267
STATUS OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
without a just cause. They will be given a hearing within five days if
removed from service pending investigation and may hear the evi-
dence submitted. They will be promptly notified in writing of the
action taken against them, and should the charge be unfounded,
they will be paid for the time lost. Disciplinary action must be taken
within thirty days after investigation or none will be applied. 9
On appeal, one of the railroad's argument was that the plaintiff
"was not employed for any particular time or term; that he could
terminate the employment at will, and defendant had the same
right."90 Although the argument raised by the railroad makes sense
in the context of an individual employment agreement, it clearly
did not apply to Norfolk Southern's agreement with the union.
The whole purpose of the Railway Labor Act is to make such con-
tracts enforceable to avoid labor disputes that could cripple Ameri-
can industry.
Ordinarily, collective bargaining agreements have a term of two
to five years. 91 During the term of the contract, the union agrees
that it will not seek wages or benefits not provided in the contract,
will not strike, and will not engage in activities inconsistent with
the agreement. Although the individual engineer could terminate
his employment at will, the union's agreement with the railroad
had a specific duration. The Virginia Supreme Court, therefore,
clearly reached the correct result in upholding the contract, but
incorrectly analyzed the issues in the context of the at-will rule.
Because Norfolk Southern involved a collective bargaining agree-
ment of definite duration, it does not contradict the at-will em-
ployment doctrine in Virginia.
Another Virginia case which recognized a specific contract of em-
ployment, but which, because of its unique facts, did not alter the
employment-at-will rule, is Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. O'Neal.92 In
Sea-Land, the employee asked to be transferred to her former tele-
89. Id. at 976, 59 S.E.2d at 111. The quoted language, as well as the nature of the railroad
industry and of the plaintiff's occupation, makes it obvious that this is a contract with the
union, not with the plaintiff as an individual. Indeed, the briefs filed in the case refer to the
agreement as a contract "made with the union." See, e.g., Appellant's Petition for Writ of
Error and Supersedeas at 2, Record No. 2643, Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d
110.
90. Id. at 975, 59 S.E.2d at 114.
91. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & G. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 15 (1960).
92. 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982).
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type job so she could attend night school. Her employer agreed but
required her to quit her sales representative job first. Pursuant to
this agreement, the plaintiff submitted her letter of resignation on
a Friday and, for the weekend at least, was unemployed. She then
reported for the teletype job the following Monday, only to be told
she would not be hired. She thus was left without employment,
having quit one job in reliance upon her employer's promise of
another.9 3
The court found that the parties had a contract to obtain em-
ployment that was "separate and apart from any contract cover-
ing the particular position involved." 4 This separate contract was
not even subject to any presumption of terminability at will" that
might otherwise have applied."' Significantly, the court stated that,
contrary to the way it dismissed plaintiff, the employer "may have
had the right to terminate [her] employment at will either while
she was still a sales representative or in the event she became a
teletype operator/messenger."' 6 Thus, while the employer became
contractually obligated to re-hire the plaintiff, it was under no ob-
ligation to retain her in its employ.
From Stonega through Norfolk Southern to Sea-Land, it is clear
that Virginia adheres to the at-will rule absent an agreement of
employment for a definite time.
B. Virginia Federal Court Decisions
Although Virginia's federal courts also have followed the em-
ployment-at-will rule, they have been more inclined to find circum-
stances that rebut the at-will presumption. Other than Judge Mer-
hige's decision in Griffith v. Electrolux Corp.,9" federal judges have
interpreted Virginia law so as to erode the at-will doctrine.
In Griffith, a discharged employee sued his former employer
claiming, among other things, breach of an employment contract.
Electrolux moved for summary judgment on the contract claim be-
cause the plaintiff was at all times employed pursuant to an oral
hiring agreement "which made no provision for any specific dura-
93. Id. at 349, 297 S.E.2d at 650.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 454 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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tion of term."98 Judge Merhige granted Electrolux's motion and
wrote:
The law is well established in Virginia ... that a contract for per-
sonal services which does not specify any term or duration of em-
ployment is terminable at will by either party. . . . Under the Vir-
ginia rule, plaintiff's contract was terminable at will by the
defendant and the reasons for the termination are immaterial. 99
More recent federal court cases, however, have charted their own
course in changing the at-will rule, despite any significant pro-
nouncement from the Virginia Supreme Court. For example, in
Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation,'"0 the federal court
erroneously applied Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Harris'0 ' and
implied a "just cause for termination" provision even though there
was no written contract (such as the collective bargaining agree-
ment relied on in Norfolk Southern). The employee in Frazier
based his contract on: (1) Colonial Williamsburg's policy of encour-
aging long-term employment; (2) Colonial Williamsburg's practice
of terminating employees only for cause; (3) Colonial Williams-
burg's oral assurances that Frazier would be fired only for cause;
and (4) the Colonial Williamsburg employee handbook which con-
tained a written assurance of termination only for cause.'0 2
Despite the absence of any contract mutually bargained for and
agreed upon, the court held that evidence of a just cause termina-
tion standard in company documents or practices could rebut the
at-will presumption. In addition, the court misinterpreted Vir-
ginia's law concerning the Statute of Frauds. In Silverman v.
Bernot,' a0 the Virginia Supreme Court distinguished between ter-
mination by operation of law and completion by performance.
The Frazier court did not. In Frazier, the court ruled that the
Statute of Frauds did not bar enforcement of an alleged oral agree-
ment to dismiss the plaintiff only for just cause.0 4 In stating that
the oral contract could have been performed within one year be-
cause the plaintiff could have been discharged for good cause
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
100. 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983).
101. 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d 110 (1950).
102. Frazier, 574 F. Supp. at 320.
103. 218 Va. 650, 239 S.E.2d 118 (1977).
104. Frazier, 574 F. Supp. at 320.
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within his first year of employment, the court in Frazier failed to
recognize the distinction between full performance and excusing
performance. Had the plaintiff in Frazier been discharged for
cause within his first year of employment, neither party would
have fully "performed." Rather, the plaintiff simply would have
breached his promise to render satisfactory service, and his breach
would have excused the employer from further performance. Be-
cause full performance within a year was not possible under the
alleged oral agreement, the Frazier court should have held any
"contract" unenforceable. Thus, Frazier misapplied Virginia law
and should not be used as authority for creating a just cause stan-
dard absent a written contract.
In Barger v. General Electric Co.,105 the federal court turned to
Frazier for the proposition that an employee may state a wrongful
discharge cause of action based on provisions of an employee hand-
book. As in Frazier, the court declined to rule that the provisions
of an employee manual constituted an employment contract since
the Virginia Supreme Court had not addressed the question. 0 6
The court did state, however, that the trier of fact should resolve
the issue of whether the policies stated in the handbook are merely
gratuitous or are contractual inducements for continued
employment. 0 7
This approach assumes that the employee's consideration for the
contract is supplied by continued employment based on reliance
on the handbook provisions. This assumption misconstrues the
promises on which contracts were based in Sea-Land Services, Inc.
v. O'Neal'°8 and Twohy v. Harris.09 In both of these cases, the
employees did more than merely continue employment; they gave
up other specific employment opportunities in reliance on specific
promises from the employers. In contrast, the broad holding of
Barger contemplates consideration flowing from the mere continu-
ation of employment alone. This concept is a misinterpretation of
Virginia cases, where only consideration in addition to continued
105. 599 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1954).
106. Id. at 1161.
107. Id. at 1164.
108. 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982).
109. 194 Va. 69, 72 S.E.2d 329 (1952). Twohy involved an employee who threatened to
resign due to inadequate compensation. The employer promised to hold corporate stock for
the benefit of the employee in consideration of the employee's continued employment. The
court found in this arrangement a contract based on valid consideration. Id. at 81, 72 S.E.2d
at 336.
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employment has been found to supply the contractual element of
consideration. Application of the analysis of Barger threatens to
expand Virginia law in a direction not borne out by Virginia case
law and would imply expectations of the parties where none have
been expressed.
Another recent Virginia federal decision, Thompson v. American
Motor Inns,110 represents an expansion of Virginia law by the fed-
eral courts. There, the plaintiff brought a diversity action for
breach of an employment contract based on an employee hand-
book and a federal age discrimination action against his former
employer. After dismissing the age discrimination claim, the court
expounded on the "erosion of the doctrine of employment-at-will."
It boldly stated that the Virginia Supreme Court has "limited its
application,"'' giving as examples Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
v. Harris"2 and Twohy v. Harris.11 3 The court referred to both
cases as representing contracts of employment for a definite term,
but failed to mention the unique facts of each case which gave rise
to those contracts: a collective bargaining agreement in Norfolk
Southern" 4 and additional consideration flowing from both em-
ployee and employer in Twohy.1 5 Interestingly, no reference is
made to Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville" 6 and the very lim-
ited tort exception recognized there.
The Thompson court's dicta concerning the status of employ-
ment-at-will in Virginia is misleading. Furthermore, its factual
findings of an implied contract of employment for a definite term
based on an employee handbook and of breach of that contract are
findings which Virginia courts have rejected. Although it may have
been inappropriate for the court to have abstained from hearing
the breach of contract issue,1 7 the court should have adhered
strictly to the Erie v. Tompkins" 8 diversity rule of federal court
application of state law. Because Virginia law has rebutted the at-
will presumption only when faced with unique facts supplying ad-
110. 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985).
111. Id. at 413.
112. 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E.2d 110 (1950).
113. 194 Va. 69, 72 S.E.2d 329 (1952).
114. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 109.
116. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985); see infra notes 126-50 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of abstention, see 1A J. MooRE, U. TAGGART, A. VEGTAL & J. WicKR,
MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTicE 203 (2d ed. 1985).
118. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ditional consideration or a collateral agreement, Thompson should
not have recognized an implied contract.
In contrast with the Western District's bold assertion in Thomp-
son that employment-at-will is an archaic doctrine which should be
limited at every opportunity, the Eastern District of Virginia, in
Mason v. Richmond Motor Co.,' 9 declined to assert jurisdiction
over state wrongful discharge claims. There, the plaintiff brought
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), breach of em-
ployment contract, and wrongful discharge claims in federal court.
Judge Warriner declined to assert pendent jurisdiction over the
state claims. 120 In an opinion which indicates consideration for the
principles of federal-state comity, Judge Warriner questioned
whether he even had the power to hear the state claims since
ADEA, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge claims share
only the common factual element of the plaintiff's discharge. He
observed that the elements of proof for each claim differ to such an
extent that "there is no 'common nucleus of operative facts' shared
by plaintiff's ADEA claims and his breach of employment contract
and tort claims.' 121
Furthermore, Judge Warriner stated that even if he had the
power to hear the state claims, he would exercise discretion and
dismiss those claims.122 Citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs123 as
authority for dismissal of pendent claims where "needless decisions
of State law might be made by the federal court and 'surer-footed
reading of applicable law' would be made in the State court,"' 24
Judge Warriner acknowledged that any alterations to the at-will
rule should be left to the state judiciary and legislature.'2 5 Where
the Thompson court was eager to herald the demise of employ-
ment-at-will, the better-reasoned Mason decision acknowledged
that any alteration of long-standing state law should be accom-
plished by the state, not by the federal judiciary.
119. Mason v. Richmond Motor Co., No. 85-0808-R, slip op. (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 1986).
120. Id. at 10-11.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 14.
123. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
124. Mason, No. 85-0808-R, slip. op. at 14.
125. Id. at 17.
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IV. BOWMAN V. STATE BANK OF KEYSVILLE12 6
A. The Narrowest of Public Policy Exceptions
A survey of public policy exceptions indicates that only those
specifically derived from a statute are consistently successful in
tempering the at-will rule. Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville 27
has acknowledged just that type of public policy exception-one
narrowly derived from established legislative policy. Accordingly,
Bowman is situated, along with other narrow exception cases, on
the initial point of the public policy continuum.
Since Bowman came before the Virginia Supreme Court on the
trial court's decision to sustain the defendant's demurrer, the
plaintiffs' allegations were taken as true for purposes of argument.
The plaintiffs, Betty P. Bowman and Joyce T. Bridges, allegedly
were fired in 1979 from their jobs as bookkeepers for the State
Bank of Keysville ("the Bank"). During their employment, Bow-
man and Bridges had owned five and six State Bank shares, re-
spectively. Before terminating Bowman and Bridges, the Bank had
entered into an agreement providing for its merger into a subsidi-
ary of another corporation. In anticipation of shareholder opposi-
tion to this merger, the plaintiffs contended that several of the
Bank's directors instructed them to vote for the merger or risk los-
ing their jobs. The plaintiffs did vote their eleven shares in favor of
the merger, creating an affirmative vote only eight shares in excess
of the necessary two-thirds approval.""s
Following the shareholder meeting held for voting on the merger,
the plaintiffs allegedly wrote a joint letter to the Bank president
stating that "their proxies were invalid, illegally obtained, 'im-
proper and null and void.' ,129 The letter also stated that the effect
of the invalid proxies was that fewer than the necessary number of
votes had been cast for approval. Shortly after receipt of this let-
ter, the Bank terminated both plaintiffs. 130
The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages for
wrongful discharge and conspiracy to interfere with contractual re-
lations. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the
126. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 536-37, 331 S.E.2d at 799.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 537, 331 S.E.2d at 800.
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conspiracy claim. The plaintiffs had alleged that, by attempting to
influence their vote and by discharging them, the Bank and Davis,
the director of the other corporation, had conspired to interfere
with the plaintiffs' contractual relations with the Bank. Because
the Motion for Judgment contained no factual allegations support-
ing Davis' participation in the decision to discharge the plaintiffs
or to influence their vote, the trial court had dismissed the conspir-
acy claim. The supreme court agreed, citing the well-established
rule that "a corporation, like an individual, cannot conspire with
itself."'s'
As to the wrongful discharge claim, however, the court reversed.
The court stated: "[A]pplying a narrow exception to the employ-
ment-at-will rule, we hold that the plaintiffs have stated a cause of
action in tort against the Bank and the named directors for im-
proper discharge."'31 2 Although the court did not elaborate on its
conception of a "narrow exception," the cases cited for authority
uniformly recognize only the narrowest exception as a means of
upholding a legislatively mandated policy. 3 3
The legislative basis of the Bowman public policy exception is
Virginia Code section 13.1-32,11 which as the court noted:
[confers] on these plaintiffs as stockholders the right to vote, for
each outstanding share of stock held, on each corporate matter sub-
mitted to a vote at a meeting of stockholders. This statutory provi-
sion contemplates that the right to vote shall be exercised free of
duress and intimidation imposed on individual stockholders by cor-
porate management. In order for the goal of the statute to be real-
ized and the public policy fulfilled, the shareholder must be able to
exercise this right without fear of reprisal from corporate manage-
ment which happens also to be the employer. Because the right con-
ferred by statute is in furtherance of established public policy, the
employer may not lawfully use the threat of discharge of an at-will
131. Id. at 541, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
132. Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
133. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(at-will employee fired in retaliation for his insistence that his employer comply with state
laws relating to food labeling); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee
fired for refusing employer's request to ask for excuse from jury duty); Sabine Pilot Serv.,
Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (employee discharged for refusal to perform an
illegal act); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978)
(bank employee discharged in retaliation for his efforts to require employer to comply with
state and federal consumer protection laws).
134. Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
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employee as a device to control the otherwise unfettered discretion
of a shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the corporation.135
Just as the court in Petermann136 found it necessary to restrain
an employer's unlimited right to discharge in order to "fully effec-
tuate the state's declared policy against perjury,"137 the Virginia
Supreme Court chose to uphold shareholder rights through a judi-
cially created remedy. Accordingly, it represents the affirmation of
a legislatively created right, not the opening of the public policy
floodgate or the decay of the at-will rule.
Because of the language of Bowman and the strong at-will tradi-
tion in Virginia, a shift to more expansive exceptions in Virginia is
highly unlikely. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where the exception
has not been based on legislative policy, but rather on judicial
sympathy for do-gooders, the trend has been to retract rather than
to expand. For example, ari Illinois appellate court has attempted
to hold the reigns on the expansive implications of Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co."38 In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 139 the plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work with a live
source of radiation called Cobalt 60 Unit. His wrongful discharge
action advanced a public policy exception based on "the public
policy of Illinois . ..that a worker should not be discharged for
refusing to work with allegedly unsafe equipment.' 40 The plaintiff
also alleged violations of Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules.
Because the plaintiff only advanced his subjective determination
that such conditions existed without presenting any hard evidence
of unsafe conditions, the court did not find a "clear or well-defined
public policy that has been contravened.' 4' In contrast to the
Palmateer decision, the appellate court here was not disposed to-
wards protecting one who had acted on suspicions alone.
The statutory provisions relied on by the Virginia Supreme
Court in Bowman arguably do not create rights for a large number
of people, but rather only for the relatively small segment of the
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959).
137. Id. at -, 344 P.2d at 27.
138. 85 I1. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
139. 123 Il. App. 3d 539, 462 N.E.2d 1262 (1984).
140. Id. at -, 462 N.E.2d at 1265.
141. Id. at -, 462 N.E.2d at 1267.
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population which owns stock. While this aspect may weaken the
soundness of the decision, it is not uncharacteristic of cases recog-
nizing the narrow exception. Generally, courts look at the clarity of
the policy advanced, i.e., whether it is statutorily derived, rather
than the portion of the populace to be affected. 142
To this extent, Bowman indicates strong judicial deference to
the legislature. If the legislature has created a right or scheme, the
courts will look carefully for an exception to the at-will rule when
employer action threatens the integrity of that scheme. Conversely,
where a plaintiff bases a wrongful discharge action on a plaintiff's
"good intentions" or personal perceptions of public interest, courts
have no business altering the at-will rule.
The Virginia Supreme Court's policy of deferring to the legisla-
ture, particularly in regard to employment matters, is a sound one.
Legislatures, both state and federal, are well structured to study
the employment relationship and have not hesitated to deal with
certain specific types of unfair treatment of employees by employ-
ers. For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, color, creed or national origin.143 The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act 44 and the Equal Pay Act 145 provide additional
protections to employees. The National Labor Relations Act gov-
erns the relationship between employers and employees who have
unionized,14 6 while the Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibits
an employer from discharging an employee on the basis of a single
garnishment.147 Virginia has similar statutes, prohibiting wage dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, 48 prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped, 149 and prohibiting the discharge of an
employee based on participation in workers' compensation. 51
These are but a few examples of the many statutes controlling
the employment relationship. It is significant that these statutes
vary widely with respect to both the procedures for invoking them
and the remedies they provide. They clearly illustrate the legisla-
ture's function of studying specific problems and, if necessary, en-
142. See supra notes 26-63 and accompanying text.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
145. Id. § 206.
146. Id. § 151.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1982).
148. VA. CODE: ANN. § 40.1-26.6 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
149. Id. § 51.01-41 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
150. Id. § 65.1-40.1.
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acting measures designed to address them. This specific legislative
approach to the employer-employee relationship obviously would
be frustrated if the supreme court were to adopt a general tort
cause of action for "wrongful discharge" based on some vague,
unarticulated notion of public policy. Accordingly, only where a
statutorily conferred right would be thwarted by termination or
where the employee has reported specific employer illegality
should the employer's discretion to discharge be reconsidered.
B. Post-Bowman Affirmation of Employment-At-Will In
Virginia
The Virginia Supreme Court's most recent post-Bowman affir-
mation of the at-will doctrine was the denial of a petition for ap-
peal in the Henrico County Circuit Court case of James v. HCA
Health Services of Virginia.151 In James, the plaintiff nurse al-
leged that her discharge breached a just cause standard "implicit"
in the employee handbook. She also contended that the discharge
was contrary to public policy, even though no statutory right was
mentioned.
The plaintiff advanced Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Foun-
dation"5 2 for the proposition that an employee handbook could cre-
ate a "just cause" termination standard, even though the hand-
book in question contained no such specific language. Her public
policy argument was tenuously grounded on a "Patient's Bill of
Rights," which did not even cover nursing personnel. The circuit
court found no just cause standard derived from the hospital's em-
ployee handbook, nor did it find any public policy violation. The
supreme court agreed.15 3 By ruling that the circuit court had not
erred in its decision, the court contradicted the federal court ap-
proach in Frazier and Barger. The supreme court has thus held
the line on employment-at-will and, in doing so, indicated that
Bowman does not open a Pandora's Box of public policy
exceptions.
151. No. 850303 (Va. Dec. 3, 1985).
152. 574 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1978); see supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
153. James, No. 850303.
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V. CONCLUSION
Within the realm of public policy exceptions, the exception an-
nounced in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville is extremely nar-
row. Because the Virginia Supreme Court used the public policy
exception only to give effect to a clearly established legislative
scheme, Virginia courts have not been given carte blanche to create
rights and remedies where no legislative action is at stake. Indeed,
the legislature is the proper forum to redress the perceived wrongs
that have led to the erosion of the at-will doctrine. That body can
study the employment relationship in depth, balance the interests
of both employer and employee, and enact measures in furtherance
of the public good. This approach has the advantage of putting all
parties on notice prospectively of acceptable conduct and would
clearly and definitively set forth the state's public policy.
